🎥 Summary of the video Fareed Zakaria – _“The two deep failures of modern liberalism” by cnn

At its core, Zakaria’s argument is that modern liberalism has lost both its economic and social balance.

1 Economic failure: technocracy + inequality

Liberalism since the 1990s embraced markets, globalisation, and technocratic governance.
It delivered growth—but also:
- regional decline (post-industrial areas)
- rising inequality
- a sense that elites are insulated from consequences
Politics became managerial rather than transformational.

👉 Result: many working- and lower-middle-class people feel abandoned by a system run by experts.

2 Cultural failure: elitism + disconnect

Liberalism shifted toward highly educated, urban, professional classes.
It became associated with:
- cultural liberalism
- identity politics
- moral certainty
This created a perception (fair or not) of condescension toward “ordinary” voters.

👉 Result: a backlash—fueling populism, nationalism, and anti-establishment politics.

Big takeaway

Zakaria’s core claim:

Liberalism is losing connection, confidence, and legitimacy among the people it claims to represent. (reddit.com)

He suggests it must recover its older, more radical, reforming energy, not just manage the status quo.

🧠 Critique of the video

Zakaria is sharp, but there are a few limits to his analysis:

✅ What he gets right

The elite capture of liberal politics is real.
The shift from class politics → cultural politics is crucial.
The idea that liberalism became managerial rather than moral is persuasive.

⚠️ Where it’s weaker

1) It underplays capitalism itself

He frames this as a failure of liberalism, but:

Many would argue the issue is neoliberal capitalism, not liberal values per se.
Liberalism didn’t just “drift”—it actively aligned with financial/global capital.

👉 So the failure may be structural, not just cultural.

2 It treats “the people” as a bit vague

Who exactly are the “left behind”?
Class, region, age, and education all matter—but he blends them.

👉 This matters when applying it to the UK.

3 It doesn’t fully confront class

Class is implicit, but not central:

The divide he describes is basically:
- graduate elite vs non-graduate majority
That is class—but he avoids saying it directly.

🇬🇧 Class and the UK: where this lands

This is where your question gets really interesting.

The UK shift (roughly 1990s → now)

Labour (especially post-Blair):

moved toward:
- middle-class, university-educated voters
- London + cities
deprioritised:
- industrial working-class identity
- unions as a central force

👉 This mirrors Zakaria’s “elite liberalism.”

The result: a class realignment

Instead of:

Left = working class
Right = elite

We now have something closer to:

Labour = urban, graduate, public-sector middle class
Conservatives / populists = older, non-graduate, ex-industrial voters

That’s a class shift, not just a political one.

🌱 The Green Party as a challenger

You’re right to frame the Greens as a challenger—but it’s a specific kind of challenge.

What the Greens represent

socially liberal
pro-environment
anti-growth (in some strands)
strong among:
- younger voters
- renters
- highly educated urbanites

Are they anti-elitist?

Here’s the tension:

✅ In one sense:

They challenge Labour from the left
They reject neoliberal economics more strongly
They appeal to disillusionment with mainstream politics

❌ But in another sense:

Their base is often even more educated and urban than Labour’s
Their politics can feel abstract or moralistic rather than material

👉 So they are not a working-class insurgency in the traditional sense.

Better way to frame it

The Greens are:

not a revolt against elitism
but a revolt within the educated liberal class

They intensify, rather than replace, the cultural direction Zakaria critiques.

🧩 Liberal paternalism (and the UK)

What is it?

Liberal paternalism =
guiding people’s choices “for their own good” while preserving formal freedom

Classic examples:

sugar taxes
nudging behaviour (behavioural economics)
public health campaigns
restrictions framed as “soft” rather than coercive

Does it exist in the UK?

Very much so.

The UK is arguably one of its main homes:

“Nudge Unit” (Behavioural Insights Team) originated in the UK
policies like:
- smoking bans
- minimum alcohol pricing (Scotland)
- sugar tax
heavy reliance on expert-led policy

👉 This fits Zakaria’s “technocratic liberalism.”

The class dimension

Here’s the uncomfortable bit:

Liberal paternalism often flows:

from educated policymakers
toward less affluent populations

Examples:

telling people how to eat
how to parent
how to spend
how to behave environmentally

👉 It can feel like: “we know better than you” politics

That’s where resentment builds.

🤔 Should liberal paternalism exist?

The case FOR it

It works (public health improvements are real)
People don’t always make rational decisions
It avoids harsher coercion

The case AGAINST it

It can be:
- patronising
- culturally blind
- class-coded
It replaces democratic persuasion with expert management

The real issue

The problem isn’t paternalism itself—it’s who controls it and how it’s perceived.

If it’s seen as:
- fair
- universal
- democratically accountable → accepted
If it’s seen as:
- imposed by elites
- targeting “other people” → backlash

🧠 Final synthesis

Zakaria describes a liberalism that has drifted away from class politics and toward elite management.
In the UK:
- Labour reflects this shift strongly
- The Greens challenge Labour—but mostly within the same social stratum
Liberal paternalism is:
- real
- effective
- but politically dangerous when tied to class hierarchy

If you want, I can push this further—e.g. whether a genuinely class-rooted left could re-emerge in the UK, or whether that space is now permanently fractured.

UK post-industrial working class

You’re circling a real tension in UK politics—but one part of your premise needs tightening first.

👉 It’s not quite accurate that “most Manchester boroughs went to Reform.”

In Greater Manchester, Labour still dominates local government and Andy Burnham won the mayoralty very comfortably (last election: May 2, 2024).
Reform UK has been growing in vote share, and in some northern and Midlands areas it’s polling strongly, but it hasn’t taken over Manchester boroughs in any sweeping sense.

That said, the pattern you’re pointing to—Reform gaining traction while figures like Burnham remain popular—is very real and worth unpacking.

🧭 The missing class: who isn’t being represented?

When we say Labour and the Greens skew “elite,” it doesn’t mean rich—it means:

👉 graduate, urban, culturally liberal, institutionally embedded

The group that’s less well represented is roughly:

non-graduates
lower-income or economically insecure
outside major city centres (or in poorer parts of them)
more socially conservative or at least less culturally progressive
sceptical of institutions (media, academia, civil service)

This is often called the “post-industrial working class”—but it also includes parts of the lower middle class.

🔀 Why Reform becomes attractive to this group

It’s not just “they’ve gone right-wing.” It’s more specific than that.

1 They reject the tone of modern liberal politics

feel talked down to on:
- immigration
- identity issues
- environment
liberal paternalism comes across as:
- “you live wrong, think wrong, vote wrong”

👉 Reform positions itself as anti-condescension, not just anti-policy.

2 Clarity beats nuance

Labour (especially under Starmer):

cautious
managerial
avoids strong positions

Greens:

morally clear but often abstract

Reform:

simple, blunt, emotionally direct

👉 In politics, clarity often beats correctness.

3 Class identity has been displaced

Old Labour:

spoke explicitly in class terms (workers vs bosses)

Modern Labour:

speaks in:
- opportunity
- growth
- stability

👉 That leaves a vacuum where class anger has nowhere to go on the left.

Reform fills it—by redirecting it toward:

immigration
government elites
“London”

🧠 Is this about rejecting left vs right entirely?

Partly, yes.

A lot of these voters don’t think in ideological terms anymore. Instead, they feel:

“No one speaks for people like me”
“Politics is run by a closed class”
“Both sides are the same”

👉 Reform benefits because it performs opposition to the whole system, not just Labour.

🌆 So why does Burnham still win big?

This is the really interesting part—and it shows the story isn’t one-directional.

Burnham succeeds where national Labour struggles

He does a few key things differently:

1 He speaks in class language again

buses, housing, wages, policing
tangible, material issues
strong regional identity (“Greater Manchester first”)

👉 That feels grounded, not abstract.

2 He positions himself against the system, not just within it

Even as Labour:

he criticises central government
frames himself as a defender of the region

👉 He doesn’t sound like a distant technocrat.

3 He blends cultural moderation with economic intervention

not aggressively “culture war” liberal
but clearly left on:
- public services
- transport
- inequality

👉 This combination is closer to what many voters actually want: economically interventionist, culturally not overbearing

4 Visibility and trust

tangible policies (e.g. bus franchising)
strong personal brand

👉 People feel: “he actually does things”

⚖️ Big picture: what’s really happening

You’re seeing a three-way split, not just left vs right:

1 Liberal-professional left

Labour core + Greens
urban, educated
culturally progressive

2 Populist right (Reform)

anti-elite
culturally conservative
economically mixed (not purely free-market)

3 Residual “material left” (Burnham-style)

class-focused
place-based
less culturally intense
pragmatic

🔥 The key tension

The voters drifting to Reform are not necessarily:

deeply right-wing
committed to free markets

They are often:

anti-system
anti-condescension
pro-recognition (respect, identity, voice)

👉 If the left doesn’t supply that, the right will.

🤔 So is Reform the “natural home” for them?

Not necessarily.

Reform is currently:

a vehicle for protest
not yet a fully trusted governing option

If Labour (or figures like Burnham) can:

re-centre class
reduce perceived cultural distance
avoid paternalism

👉 those voters are absolutely recoverable

🧠 Final thought

This isn’t just about policy—it’s about social alignment.

Right now, many voters feel:

the people making the rules don’t live like me, think like me, or respect me

Reform exploits that.

Burnham partially resolves it.

Labour nationally is still stuck in between—competent, but not rooted.

👉 What would a genuinely class-rooted, post-liberal political movement look like today—and could it win?

🧱 1. Start with the core break: what it is not

A credible “post-liberal” or class-rooted movement would reject three things at once:

❌ Not technocratic liberalism (current Labour default)

not run by experts talking about “growth frameworks”
not vague managerial competence

❌ Not identity-first politics (caricature of the modern left)

not led by abstract social justice language
not culturally moralising

❌ Not right-wing populism (Reform)

not primarily about immigration or culture war
not anti-state in an economic sense

👉 Instead, it would re-anchor politics around material life + dignity + place

🧭 2. The core philosophy: “material dignity”

If you had to boil it down to one idea:

People should have control, security, and respect in their everyday lives.

That means combining:

economic intervention (left-wing)
cultural restraint (not aggressively progressive or conservative)
democratic grounding (anti-elite, but not anti-institution)

🏗️ 3. What policies would actually define it?

Not a long manifesto—just a few felt priorities.

🏠 A Cost of living + economic security

massive housebuilding (including social housing)
energy cost stabilisation (public involvement in energy markets)
stronger wage floors (sectoral bargaining, not just minimum wage)

👉 Not ideological socialism—practical economic protection

🚌 B Visible, local improvements

This is where Burnham is the template:

transport (buses, trains under local control)
high streets, policing, GP access
regional investment

👉 The key: people must see change in their area

🏭 C Rebuilding “useful work”

industrial policy (green + manufacturing)
apprenticeships over just university expansion
valuing non-graduate pathways

👉 This directly addresses the class divide Greens/Labour struggle with.

🌍 D Controlled, honest immigration policy

This is where many left projects fail.

A post-liberal movement would say:

immigration has economic benefits
but also real pressures (housing, wages, services)

👉 So:

lower overall numbers or better infrastructure planning
no moralising tone
no denial of trade-offs

This is crucial—because avoidance here pushes voters to Reform.

🧠 E Anti-paternalism (tone as much as policy)

less “nudging people to behave correctly”
more treating people as রাজনৈতিক equals

Examples:

climate policy framed around jobs + cheaper energy, not guilt
public health framed around support, not blame

🗣️ 4. The tone: this matters more than policy

This kind of movement would sound:

plain-speaking, not academic
emotionally grounded, not abstract
respectful, not corrective

👉 The test is simple:

Does this sound like someone who lives a similar life to the voter?

Burnham passes this test more than most national figures.

🧑‍🤝‍🧑 5. The coalition it would build

This is the interesting part—it’s a cross-pressure coalition:

It would include:

traditional working class (post-industrial areas)
lower middle class (small business, trades)
some public sector workers
parts of the “left-behind” youth (non-graduates especially)

It would lose:

some highly progressive, graduate, urban voters
parts of the current Green base

👉 But it could replace losses with voters currently going to Reform

⚠️ 6. The big obstacles

This is why it doesn’t fully exist yet:

1 Labour’s internal coalition

heavily shaped by graduates + public sector + urban voters
cautious about culture + immigration

2 Media + institutional pressure

anything deviating from liberal norms gets labelled:
- “populist”
- “dog-whistle”
- or worse

3 The Greens’ limitations

strong morally, weak materially (in class terms)
struggle outside educated urban base

4 Reform’s advantage

emotionally simple
doesn’t need to govern (yet)

🔄 7. Where this is already happening (partially)

You can already see fragments of this model:

Andy Burnham (Manchester) → material + regional + grounded tone
Some “Blue Labour” thinkers → class, community, culture
Dan Carden / parts of Labour left → economic focus without heavy cultural framing

But it’s not unified.

🔥 8. The strategic insight

Here’s the key point tying everything together:

👉 The voters moving to Reform are not primarily asking for right-wing economics.

They are asking for:

recognition
control
fairness
voice

And they currently feel:

liberal politics offers them management, not representation

🧠 Final answer to your core question

Yes—Reform is benefiting from a gap between liberal-left politics and class-rooted voters.

But:

it’s not because those voters “want the right”
it’s because the left stopped speaking their language—materially and culturally

And:

👉 Burnham’s success shows those voters are still winnable without becoming right-wing

If you want, I can take this one step further and sketch what happens over the next 5–10 years:

whether Labour adapts
whether Reform stabilises
and whether a new alignment replaces left vs right entirely

My Journey

Explorer

liberal elites and challengers

Table of Contents